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Ronald L. Goranson *
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
HE United States Supreme Court issued two opinions during the Sur-
vey period addressing the protections encompassed by the sixth
amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel.I One of the cases,
Pennsylvania v. Finley,2 concerned counsel's effectiveness in a state collateral
review proceeding. In 1967 the Court established, in Anders v. California,3
the procedures that appointed counsel must follow to withdraw from repre-
senting an indigent defendant in an appeal as a matter of right when the
attorney believes the appeal is frivolous.4 In Pennsylvania v. Finley a six
justice majority held that the Anders procedures need not be observed in
state post-conviction proceedings, even if state law entitled the defendant to
appointed counsel. 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, stating
that Anders did not set down an independent constitutional requirement all
lawyers must follow in all proceedings. 6 The Chief Justice then stated that
Anders established a prophylactic framework relevant only when a litigant
established a constitutional right to counsel. 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist fur-
ther asserted that the constitutional right to counsel extended only to the
first appeal of right and not further. 8 Accordingly, the Court held that no
consitutional right to counsel exists when pursuing a discretionary appeal on
direct review, or when pursuing a post-conviction collateral attack, as Finley
was attempting. 9
* B.S.B.A., University of Arkansas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Milner, Goranson and Udashen, Dallas, Texas.
1. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987).
3. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
4. In addition to filing a request to withdraw, counsel must file a brief noting any argua-
ble claims. Id. The appealing defendant is furnished with a copy of the brief and afforded an
opportunity to raise additional points. Id. The court must then, after examining all proceed-
ings, determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Id.
5. 107 S. Ct. 1990 at 1993, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 545.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586
(1982); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).
9. Id.
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The second Supreme Court case, Burger v. Kemp,10 produced a long and
fact-specific opinion concerning the effectiveness of counsel. Burger's first
claim asserted a right to assistance of counsel free from a conflict of inter-
est. I" Burger based his claim on the fact that Burger's court-appointed trial
counsel was in partnership with co-defendant's court-appointed counsel. 12
Claims involving conflicts of interest among trial counsel are not subject to
the two-prong Strickland analysis,' 3 but are subject to the presumed preju-
dice standard if the defendant demonstrates that the attorney represented
conflicting interests that adversely affected the attorney's performance.' 4 In
a 5-4 decision the Court held that, contrary to showing trial counsel's repre-
sentation constituted an active representation of competing interests, the
joint representation may well have benefited Burger.'5 Burger's second
claim of ineffectiveness of counsel alleged a failure to develop and present
mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing hearings. The Court analyzed
this claim under the Strickland two-prong analysis.' 6 The Court held that
although trial counsel could have made a more thorough investigation, he
conducted a sufficient investigation to make a reasonable strategic deci-
sion. '7 Burger thus failed to meet the first prong of Strickland, which re-
quires that counsel's decisions fall below an objective standard of reasonably
professional judgment. 18
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that trial counsel in Ex parte
Wilson 19 was ineffective because the attorney failed to convey to his client a
plea bargain offer. The Wilson court stated that counsel had a duty to dis-
close all plea bargain offers, and failure to do so constituted conduct falling
below an objective standard of reasonableness. 20 Since the defendant testi-
fied that he would have accepted the plea bargain offer rather than risk the
automatic life sentence, the court held that the defendant met Strickland's
second prong by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
10. 107 S. Ct. 3114, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1987).
11. In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942), the Court recognized that the
sixth amendment right to effective counsel included conflict-free assistance of counsel.
12. Burger's counsel interviewed the co-defendant and assisted in representing the co-
defendant, who was tried separately. The attorneys discussed both cases with one another and
shared their legal research. Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 3119, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 649.
13. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that a defendant must show that the attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonably professional judgment, and the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's deficient performance, the proceeding would have led to a different result. The
Court defined reasonable probability as a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. at 694; see Goranson, Criminal Procedure.: Trial and Appeal, Annual Survey of
Texas Law 41 Sw. L.J. 529, 534-35 (1987); Keck & Johnson, Criminal Procedure: Trial and
Appeal, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 583, 589 (1986); Keck, Criminal Procedure:
Trial and Appeal, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 495, 497-99 (1985).
14. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)).
15. Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 3120, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 650.
16. Id. at 3119, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 649-50.
17. Id. at 3126, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 657.
18. Id.
19. 724 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
20. Id. (citing Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 416 (1986)).
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action, the proceeding would have led to a different result. 2'
II. GUILTY PLEAS
Prior Survey reviews concerning guilty pleas have generally concerned en-
forcement of plea bargains by defendants pursuant to the rationale of
Santobello v. New York. 22 During the current Survey period, the Supreme
Court in Ricketts v. Adamson 23 addressed the issue of the defendant's breach
of a plea bargain. The state originally charged Adamson with first degree
murder. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the state reduced the charge to second
degree murder. The basis of the bargain was Adamson's promise to testify
against other persons involved in the murder. The agreement specifically
provided that if Adamson refused to testify, the agreement was null and void
and the original charge would be automatically reinstated. In accordance
with the agreement, Adamson testified against the co-defendants, who were
convicted of first degree murder. Subsequently, the court reversed the co-
defendant's convictions, and Adamson refused to testify at the retrial. The
state reinstated its charges against Adamson for first degree murder, and his
trial resulted in a death sentence. Adamson claimed that the second prose-
cution violated the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause. 24 In a 5-4
opinion, the Supreme Court held that Adamson's breach of the plea bargain
agreement removed the double jeopardy bar and permitted prosecution for
first degree murder.25 According to the Court the prosecution is entitled to
specific performance of the plea bargain; if refused, the prosecution is enti-
tled to withdraw the plea and reinstate the original charge. 26
Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure27 provides the statutory
requirements for a guilty plea. The legislature amended the statute to pro-
vide that admonitions that the state must give to an accused before a guilty
plea is accepted can now be given in writing.28
21. Id. at 74-75.
22. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). When a prosecutor's promise induces a guilty plea, the promise
must be fulfilled. Id. at 262; see Goranson, supra note 13, at 539-42.
23. 107 S. Ct. 2680, 2685-87, 97 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11-13 (1987).
24. The fifth amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
25. 107 S. Ct. at 2685, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 11.
26. Id. at 2686-87, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 12-13; see Thi Van Le v. Perkins, 700 S.W.2d 768, 774
(Tex. App.-Austin 1985), pet. mand. sub nom Perkins v. Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (holding that specific performance is preferred remedy when
plea bargain is breached). The Court of Criminal Appeals also stated that a defendant is
entitled to specific performance if the agreement can be enforced. Perkins, 738 S.W.2d at 283.
27. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
28. Section d of the statute was amended as follows:
The court may make the admonitions required by this article either orally or
in writing. If the court makes the admonitions in writing, it must receive a
statement signed by the defendant and the defendant's attorney that he under-
stands the admonitions and is aware of the consequences of his plea. If the
defendant is unable or refuses to sign the statement, the court shall make the
admonitions orally.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13, § (d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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III. JURY TRIAL ISSUES
A. Batson v. Kentucky
In 1986, the Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentucky29 that a prosecu-
tor may not use peremptory strikes solely on the basis of race.30 In Griffith
v. Kentucky3' the Supreme Court held that the Batson holding applied retro-
actively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet
final. 32 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the Batson holding
in two cases. In Keeton v. State33 and Henry v. State,34 the Texas trial judges
had overruled the defendants' objections to the prosecutors' use of peremp-
tory challenges to members of the voir dire panel sharing the same race as
the defendants. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded each case to the
trial court for a factual hearing to determine: (1) whether the defendant was
part of a racial group; (2) whether the prosecutor peremptorily struck mem-
bers of that group; and (3) whether the relevant circumstances raised an
inference that the prosecutor struck the members solely because of their
race. 35 Upon a proper showing by the defense the burden then shifted to the
prosecutor to establish a neutral explanation for the strikes.36 The court
suggested remedies, including installing minority venirepersons on the jury
or quashing the panel. 37 The Keeton opinion states that the trial judge's
decision as to whether a neutral explanation for the use of the peremptory
strikes exists should be given great weight on appeal. 38
B. Jury Selection in General
Article 35.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure39 requires that the names
of prospective jurors be shuffled upon timely request before the commence-
ment of voir dire.4° Prior case law establishes that the defendant and the
prosecutor have the right to see the panel seated before deciding whether to
ask for a jury shuffle.41 In Williams v. State42 the jury panel had been seated
and the trial judge had addressed and questioned the panel for thirty min-
utes. As the trial judge was about to permit the prosecutor to begin voir
dire, defense counsel requested a jury shuffle. The trial court denied the
request as untimely. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that
29. 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 83 (1986).
30. See Goranson, supra note 13, at 544-46.
31. 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987).
32. Id. at 710, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 654. The case is also important because it announced a
major change in retroactivity analysis. For a discussion of the retroactivity rule see infra notes
186-90 and accompanying text.
33. 724 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
34. 729 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
35. Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 65; Henry, 729 S.W.2d at 734.
36. Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 65; Henry, 729 S.W.2d at 734.
37. Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 65; Henry, 729 S.W.2d at 734.
38. Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 64.
39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.11 (Vernon 1966).
40. Id.; see Alexander v. State, 523 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
41. Eldridge v. State, 666 S.W.2d 357, 358-59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984).
42. 719 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
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the voir dire begins when the court permits the prosecution to commence
voir dire and the prosecutor actually begins the examination. 43
Article 35.16(a)(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure" provides that a
venireperson may be challenged for cause if the venireperson has a mental
defect that renders him unfit for jury service.45 In Gardner v. State46 the
court of criminal appeals held that low intelligence could constitute a mental
defect rendering a venireperson unfit for jury service. Accordingly, the court
permitted the State's challenge to a juror not smart enough to comprehend a
juror's function at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. In a case
that could reduce the amount of time required for capital jury selection, the
court of criminal appeals in Barnard v. State47 permitted partial group voir
dire in a capital case. The trial judge allowed, but did not require, both sides
to voir dire the entire panel on general principles of law before beginning
individual voir dire. The appellate court held that although article 35.17 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure48 required individual voir dire upon re-
quest, the statute did not prohibit a concurrent right of general voir dire.49
The appellate court did not find error in the trial court's procedure and also
validated the procedure as a good idea.50
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL
A. Confrontation
The Supreme Court again paid considerable attention to the confrontation
clause51 of the sixth amendment.5 2 The Court decided five cases addressing
confrontation clause issues, two of which dealt with variations on the fact
situation presented in Bruton v. United States.5 3 Bruton held that a non-
testifying co-defendant's confession implicating another defendant may not
be introduced at the joint trial of the two defendants unless the confession is
edited to eliminate all references to the defendant. 54 In a later Supreme
Court case four justices suggested that if the co-defendant's confession inter-
locked with a confession given by the defendant the Bruton problem would
disappear.55 During this term, in Cruz v. New York, 56 the Supreme Court
repudiated the plurality's suggestion and held that the interlocking confes-
sion doctrine violated Bruton. The majority opinion written by Justice
43. Id. at 577.
44. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
45. Id.
46. 730 S.W.2d 675, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (specifically disclaiming that
low apparent intelligence is a per se ground for challenge).
47. 730 S.W.2d 703, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
48. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.17 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
49. 730 S.W.2d at 715-16.
50. Id.
51. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52. See Goranson, supra note 13, at 549-52.
53. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
54. Id. at 134, n.10.
55. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 75 (1979).
56. 107 S. Ct. 1714, 1719, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 172 (1987).
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Scalia held that Bruton was concerned with the likelihood a jury would obey
a court's instruction to disregard a non-testifying co-defendant's confession
in deciding the defendant's guilt.57 Justice Scalia further opined that the
interlocking nature of confessions pertained to the confessions' reliability
and not to the harmfulness of the co-defendant's confession to the defend-
ant's case.58 Since Bruton was based upon the harmfulness issue and not the
reliability issue, Justice Scalia asserted that the introduction of the co-de-
fendant's unedited confession in Cruz' trial constituted constitutional er-
ror.59 A decision rendered on the same day as Cruz demonstrated the
Court's reluctance to expand Bruton. In Richardson v. Marsh 60 the Court
held that the admission of a co-defendant's confession edited to remove all
reference to the existence of the non-confessing defendant is not barred by
Bruton, even if the defendant is linked to the confession by other evidence, so
long as the court instructs the jury not to consider the confession against the
defendant. 61
The Supreme Court thwarted a defendant's attempt to use the confronta-
tion clause to force disclosure of records for impeachment purposes in Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie.62 Ritchie, charged with sexually assaulting his minor
daughter, sought access to state maintained records concerning her for im-
peachment purposes. The trial court did not permit disclosure. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that under both the confrontation clause and
the compulsory process clause, 63 the trial court should have allowed the de-
fense counsel to examine the records. 64 The Supreme Court avoided the
compulsory process claim, noting that the Court has handled similar dis-
covery claims pursuant to the broader protections of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause.65  Employing a Brady66 analysis, the Court
required the trial court to inspect the questionable evidence and determine
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial would
have been different if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense. 67 The
Supreme Court stated that recognition of the confrontation clause claim
57. Id. at 1718-19, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 171.
58. Id. at 1719, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 171.
59. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 172.
60. 107 S. Ct. 1702, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987).
61. Id. at 1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 186-87. The other evidence in this case was the defend-
ant's own testimony. The Court remanded the case to determine whether trial counsel's fail-
ure to object to the prosecutor's argument urging the jury to use the confession in evaluating
the defendant's testimony could serve as a basis for relief. Id. at 1709, 95 L. Ed. at 188.
62. 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987).
63. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .......
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
64. Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 509 Pa. 357, 367, 502 A.2d 148, 153 (1985).
65. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 56. The fourteenth
amendment provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the prosecution has the obli-
gation to disclose "evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material
to guilt or punishment." See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
67. 107 S. Ct. at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 57 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (1985)).
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would effectively create a new constitutionally compelled rule of pre-trial
discovery. 68 After concluding that nothing in the case law supported
Ritchie's argument, the Court stated that "the right of confrontation is a
trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of ques-
tions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. '69
Last term the Supreme Court held that a non-testifying conspirator's out-
of-court statement satisfying Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) 70 may
be admitted without showing the conspirator's unavailability. 71 This term in
Bourjaily v. United States72 the Court held that a trial court may consider a
hearsay statement in making a preliminary factual determination required
by Rule 803 as to whether the alleged conspiracy existed and whether the
statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a literal interpretation of
the confrontation clause might bar the use of any out-of-court statements
when the declarant was unavailable. 73 The Court explicitly rejected that
view in Ohio v. Roberts.74 In an attempt to harmonize the confrontation
clause goal of limiting the types of evidence a court may receive against a
defendant with the public policy interest in accurate factfinding, the Court
required both a showing of unavailability and an independent showing of
indications of reliability surrounding the out-of-court declaration. 75 The
Court noted, however, that courts need not perform such an inquiry when
the evidence falls under a well established hearsay exception. 76 The Court
further asserted that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule was
sufficiently rooted in our jurisprudence that a trial court need not indepen-
dently inquire into the reliability of the statements. 77
In Kentucky v. Stincer78 the Court held that a defendant lacks an abso-
lute right under either the confrontation clause or the due process clause to
be present at a pre-trial hearing to determine the competency of the minor
complaining witnesses, at least as long as the defendant's counsel was per-
mitted to attend. The 6-3 majority opinion by Justice Blackmun noted that
confrontation clause cases either involve admissions of out-of-court state-
ments or restrictions on cross-examination, both of which indicate that the
purpose of the confrontation clause is to ensure a defendant the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness. 79 Justice Blackmun reasoned that since the
68. Id. at 999, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 54.
69. Id.
70. The rule provides, "[a] statement is not hearsay if... [tihe statement is offered against
a party and is . . (E) a statement by a coconspirator [sic] of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EvID. 801(d).
71. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
72. 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2780, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144, 154 (1987).
73. Id. at 2782, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 157.
74. 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
75. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 157 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at
65-66).
76. Id. at 2783, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 157 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
77. Id., 97 L. Ed. 2d at 158.
78. 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2666, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 646-47 (1987).
79. Id. at 2663-64, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 642-43.
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witnesses' competency hearing did not involve any of the matters in issue at
trial and because many of the questions asked at the hearing were asked
during the trial, the defendant failed to establish a violation of the defend-
ant's confrontation rights.8 0 The Court recognized the due process right of a
defendant to be present whenever his presence has a reasonably substantial
relation to his opportunity to defend fully against the charge. 8 1 Because the
defendant failed to show that the defendant's presence would have contrib-
uted to a more reliable competence determination, the Court also rejected
his due process claim.8 2
In Long v. State 8 3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cited violations of
the federal and state confrontation8 4 and due process8 5 clauses in holding
section 2 of article 38.07186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitu-
tional. The statute permitted the use as evidence of the ex parte videotaping
of a child victim in sexual abuse cases.8 7 Furthermore, the statute required
the child to attend the trial, authorized the defendant to call the child wit-
ness to the stand as the sole method of exercising his right to cross-examine,
and alternatively authorized the prosecution to call the child and have the
testimony repeated in front of the jury before cross-examination. 88 The
lengthy and detailed opinion written by Judge Duncan first traced the his-
tory of both the federal and state confrontation clauses and concluded that
meaningful confrontation requires the opportunity for contemporaneous
cross-examination. 8 9 Since the statute failed to provide for contemporane-
ous cross-examination, it failed to meet constitutional confrontation stan-
dards.90 The court in Long also held that the procedure suggested by the
statute significantly altered accepted trial procedures by permitting the pros-
ecution to present its case-in-chief twice and thereby bolster its position.9 1
According to the court, the statute exchanged fairness for an advantage
through duplication of evidence, which violated due process. 92
80. Id. at 2666, 96 L. Ed. 646-47.
81. Id. at 2667, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 647 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1934)).
82. Id. at 2668, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 648.
83. 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (reh'g pend.).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
86. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Long, 742 S.W.2d at 318. Judge Duncan, in reaching the conclusion that both con-
frontation clauses were violated, stated: "a statute that is not individualized to a particular
prosecution and on its face and in its operation assumes that confrontation in a particular class
of cases will produce unnecessary trauma is constitutionally unacceptable." Id. at 317.
90. Id. at 321.
91. Id. at 322. The prosecution first introduced the tape of the witness and then called her
as a witness in rebuttal. Id. at 304.
92. Id. at 322 (citing Hulin v. State, 438 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)). The opin-
ion did not address sections 3 and 4 of the statute, which permit court-ordered videotaping on
a case by case basis and with contemporaneous cross-examination. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, §§ 3-4 (Vernon Supp. 1987). These statutes should be read, however,
in conjunction with the "presence of the defendant" due process issue discussed in Kentucky v.
Stincer. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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Effective October 20, 1987 the legislature significantly amended article
38.071 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 93 The statute as amended, how-
ever, does not address the issues raised by Long. In particular, the amended
statute permits the admission of an ex parte recorded oral statement of a
child victim of sexual abuse taken before indictment or the filing of a com-
plaint.94 Passed before the Long opinion was rendered, the amendment per-
mits defense counsel to submit written interrogatories to the child.95 The
amended statute also includes provisions that permit videotaping the child's
testimony and exclude the defendant from the room, but permit the defend-
ant to "communicate contemporaneously with his attorney during periods of
recess or by audio contact .... ',96 The amendments to the statute adopted
by the 1987 legislature simply do not address the contemporaneous cross-
examination requirement established by Long. Accordingly the statute re-
mains suspect on constitutional grounds.
B. Opening Statements
In 1987, the Legislature amended article 36.01 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. 97 The amendment permits defense counsel to make an opening
statement immediately after the prosecutor's opening statement.9  The
amendment applies to cases in which the indictment is read on or after Sep-
tember 1, 1987.
C. Extraneous Offenses
As last year's Survey indicated, the question of the admissibility of extra-
neous offenses is one of the more troubling problems facing trial courts.99
93. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
94. Id. Section 2(a) provides:
The recording of an oral statement of the child made before the indictment is
returned or the complaint has been filed is admissible into evidence if the court
makes a determination that the factual issues of identity or actual occurrence
were fully and fairly inquired into in a detached manner by a neutral individual
experienced in child abuse cases that seeks to find the truth of the matter.
Id § 2(a).
95. Id. Sections 2(b) and (c) provide:
(b) If a recording is made under Subsection (a) of this section and after an in-
dictment is returned or a complaint has been filed, by motion of the attorney
representing the state or the attorney representing the defendant and on the
approval of the court, both attorneys may propound written interrogatories that
shall be presented by the same neutral individual who made the initial inquiries,
if possible, and recorded under the same or similar circumstances of the original
recording with the time and date of the inquiry clearly indicated in the record-
ing. (c) A recording made under Subsection (a) of this section is not admissible
into evidence unless a recording made under Subsection (b) is admitted at the
same time if a recording under Subsection (b) was requested prior to time of
trial.
Id § 2(b), (c).
96. Id. at § 4(a).
97. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
98. Id. Article 36.01 was amended by adding the following language: "(b) The defend-
ant's counsel may make the opening statement for the defendant immediately after the attor-
ney representing the State makes the opening statement for the State . Id
99. See Goranson, supra note 13, at 552-54.
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The court of criminal appeals in Templin v. State 100 stated that the admissi-
bility of evidence of prior misconduct is not subject to a definite test, and the
court must balance the relation of the prior conduct to the alleged offense
against the probative value of the evidence compared to its prejudicial effect.
The two-part evaluation is generally left to the trial judge, and his decision
will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.101 Under prior case
law, a recognized exception to the extraneous offense rule applied in child
sex abuse cases. Specifically, prior sex abuse episodes between the defendant
and the complainant were admissible once the defendant denied the act or
undermined the complainant's credibility. 102 A line of cases allowed admis-
sion of prior extraneous sexual offenses between the accused and other vic-
tims. 10 3 In Boutwell v. State,!°4 a 5-4 decision with three separate
concurring opinions and one concurrence in the result, the court of criminal
appeals held that admitting extraneous sexual offenses involving other vic-
tims amounted to saying "once a sex offender, always a sex offender." The
court then held that extraneous offenses not related to the specific offense
alleged or to any aspect of the alibi defense are not admissible.' 0 5
D. The Defendant's Right to Testify
In Rock v. Arkansas 106 the defendant had been charged in the shooting
death of her husband. After a hypnotic session she recalled that her finger
had not been on the trigger, which indicated the gun may have been defec-
tive. The trial court refused to admit the hypnotically refreshed testimony.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed and adopted a per se rule against the
admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 0 7 A 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court ruled that a per se rule excluding the hypnotically refreshed
testimony of criminal defendants violated the constitutional right to testify
on one's own behalf. 108 Rock v. Arkansas is the first case involving hypnosis
reviewed by the Supreme Court. The Court specifically declined to decide
the admissibility of testimony by previously hypnotized witnesses other than
the defendant.' 0 9 The Court based the defendant's constitutional right to
100. 711 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (citing Plante v. State, 692
S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983) (en banc); Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex Crim. App. 1979)).
101. 711 S.W.2d at 33.
102. See Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (extraneous acts ad-
missable on the issue of intent); Wingo v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 162, 229 S.W. 858 (1921).
103. See McDonald v. State, 513 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Johnston v. State, 418
S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Both cases were overruled by Boutwell v. State, 719
S.W.2d 164, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
104. 719 S.W.2d 164, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
105. Id. at 180.
106. 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987).
107. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 573, 708 S.W.2d 78, 81 (1986), vacated, Rock v. Arkan-
sas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987).
108. 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 53.
109. Id. at 2714, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 52; see Vester v. State, 713 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986). In Vester the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals side-stepped the issue of admissi-
bility of hypnotically induced testimony by holding that the complaining witness's testimony
concerning the identification of the accused was based on facts other than the hypnotically
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testify on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of compulsory process and
right to personally make one's own defense and the fifth amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 110 Writing for the majority, Justice Black-
mun specifically noted that a state may not use rules of witness competency
and rules of evidence to prevent the admission of relevant testimony. 111 The
Court remanded the case to the trial court because the prosecution failed to
submit sufficient justification to exclude all of defendant's the post-hypnosis
testimony. 112
E. Evidentiary Matters
In Powell v. State,113 a capital murder case, the trial court with the defense
attorney's permission ordered psychiatric examinations of the defendant for
sanity and competency. Based on the results of the examinations the jury
rejected the defense of insanity. At the punishment stage, the doctors testi-
fied on the issue of future dangerousness, although the prosecution failed to
give the defendant or his counsel notice that a determination of future dan-
gerousness would form part of the original examination. The defense attor-
ney made a trial objection based on Estelle v. Smith.1 14 The court of
criminal appeals affirmed admission of the testimony, holding that when the
defendant introduced testimony from any mental health expert to prove in-
sanity, he waived his fifth amendment privilege.' 15 Judge McCormick's
opinion also noted that the sole purpose in the Smith requirement of notice
to counsel was to permit counsel to consult with the defendant about his fifth
amendment rights before deciding whether to answer future dangerousness
questions. 1 6 The court reasoned that since the defendant has waived his
fifth amendment rights the prosecution's failure to give notice produced no
reversible sixth amendment violation.1 17
The court of criminal appeals reviewed the case law concerning third
party guilt in Erwin v. State.118 The Erwin court recognized two rules. The
first rule permits the defendant to introduce evidence that identifies a state's
induced facts. Id. at 923. Thus, the testimony hypnotically induced was cumulative of already
reliable identification testimony. For a review of the law concerning hypnotically induced
testimony see Judge Clinton's concurring opinion in Vester. Id. at 924-29.
110. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2709, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 46. The Court held in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971), that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion guarantees the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exer-
cise of his own will' . . The choice of whether to testify in one's own defense ... is an
exercise of the constitutional privilege." Id.. at 230 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964)).
111. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2710-11, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 47-48 (citing Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
112. Id. at 2714-15, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 52-53.
113. 742 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
114. 451 U.S. 454, 471, 473-74 (1981) (requiring warnings to accused pursuant to fifth
amendment and notice to his counsel pursuant to sixth amendment before mental examina-
tions are permitted).
115. Powell, 742 S.W.2d at 358.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 729 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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witness as the perpetrator of the offense.1 19 Derived from the absent party
line of cases, the second rule permits the defendant to introduce evidence
tending to establish that a non-prosecution witness committed the offense,
but only if the prosecution's case relies on circumstantial evidence. 120
In 1983 the Supreme Court held that refusal to submit to a lawfully re-
quested chemical breath test did not constitute a compelled communication
and therefore, was admissible against a fifth amendment self-incrimination
claim.12 1 A state defendant's claim that the admission of his refusal to take
a chemical breath test violated the Texas constitutional self-incrimination
privilege122 was considered in Thomas v. State.123 The Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals held that neither language differences nor policy considerations
dictated a broader meaning of compulsion under the state constitution and
followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 124
The Gaskin 125 rule compels the prosecution to tender a witness's written
statement for purposes of cross-examination. In Cullen v. State 126 the court
of criminal appeals held that the Gaskin rule required the prosecution to
produce tape-recorded statements and transcripts of tape-recorded state-
ments made by testifying witnesses. In Cullen the prosecutor taped a pre-
trial interview with a prosecution witness. The court of criminal appeals
held that the trial court had a duty to inspect the recording in camera to
determine whether the recording was a discoverable statement by the wit-
ness or the non-discoverable work product of the prosecutor.1 27 On review'
of the tape, the court found it to be the prosecutor's work product and,
therefore, not discoverable. 2
8
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S CHARGE TO THE JURY
Any review of the law of jury charges begins with Almanza v. State,129 the
119. Id. at 714-15 (citing Carter v. State, 390 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Dubose
v. State, 10 Tex. App. 230 (1881).
120. Id. at 715-16 (citing Ramirez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Stone
v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. 364, 265 S.W. 900 (1924)). An analysis of the admissibility of third
party declarations against penal interest begins with Dubose v. State, 10 Tex. App. 230 (1881),
which stated that if evidence showed that a third party had an opportunity to commit an
offense, threats by the third party had strong probative force. In the nine year period between
1902 and 1911 the court decided four cases concerning declarations against penal interest by
third persons as evidence of the accused's innocence, including Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Crim.
30, 114 S.W. 814, 815 (1908), which held such evidence was admissible, especially in circum-
stantial evidence cases. Subsequently, in Walsh v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 208, 211 S.W. 241
(1919), the court, citing Blocker, held that such testimony was admissible only in circumstan-
tial cases. Id. at 216-17, 211 S.W.2d at 245; see C. MCCORMICK AND R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 1006, at 8-9 (2d ed. 1956).
121. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983).
122. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
123. 723 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
124. Id. at 703-04.
125. Gaskin v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467 (1961).
126. 719 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
127. Id. at 198.
128. Id.
129. 645 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (en banc). In Almanza, the court adopted a two-prong test for analyzing error
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1985 court of criminal appeals opinion overruling more than a hundred
years of case law. The Almanza decision presents two separate standards for
appellate review. If the trial court overrules a proper objection or properly
requested instruction, then the appellate court must determine whether the
defendant suffered any harm.' 30 If the defendant failed to make a proper
objection, then only fundamental error can be reviewed, and the defendant
must show that the harm is egregious.' 31
As a general rule, presumptions should not be included in a jury charge
unless the presumption is established by section 2.05 of the Penal Code.' 32
In Browning v. State 133 the court of criminal appeals noted that some trial
courts had been giving jury instructions on the law of presumptions arising
from sources other than the Penal Code. One such presumption, that the act
of breaking and entering at nighttime raises a presumption of an intent to
commit a theft, provided the subject matter in Browning.134 In an opinion
by Judge Clinton, the court of criminal appeals first held that old legal axi-
oms or rules for appellate consideration do not constitute legal presump-
tions.' 35 The court further held that a jury instruction stating the legal
axiom or evidentiary presumption as a statutory presumption amounted to
contained in a trial court's charge to the jury. If the error is considered ordinary reversible
error, an objection or requested instruction is necessary to preserve the error, but only some
harm is necessary to cause a reversal. 645 S.W.2d at 171. If no objection or requested instruc-
tion was filed, the error must be fundamental, and only error so egregious and harmful as to
deprive the accused of a fair trial will result in a reversal. 645 S.W.2d at 171-72; see Keck &
Johnson, supra note 13, at 634-36, and Goranson, supra note 13, at 565-66.
130. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In Hayes v. State, 728
S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) the court of criminal appeals stated: "If the error was
properly preserved at trial, any harm, regardless of degree, is sufficient to require reversal of
the conviction. 'Cases involving preserved charging error will be affirmed only if no harm has
occurred.' "
131. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d at 172.
132. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.05 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Section 2.05 of the Penal Code
provides:
When this code or another penal law establishes a presumption with respect
to any fact, it has the following consequences:
(1) if there is sufficient evidence of the facts that give rise to the presumption,
the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury,
unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly precludes a find-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt of the presumed fact; and
(2) if the existence of the presumed fact is'submitted to the jury, the court
shall charge the jury, in terms of the presumption and the specific element to
which it applies, as follows: (A) that the facts giving rise to the presumption
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (B) that if such facts are proven
beyond a reasonable doubt the jury may find that the element of the offense
sought to be presumed exists, but it is not bound to so find; (C) that even though
the jury may find the existence of such. element, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the other elements of the offense charged; and (D) if
the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a fact or facts giving rise to
the presumption, the presumption fails and the jury shall not consider the pre-
sumption for any purpose.
Id
133. 720 S.W.2d 504, 506-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
134. Id. at 505.
135. Id. at 506-07.
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an improper comment on the weight of the evidence.1 36
Judge Clinton also wrote the opinion in Johnson v. State 137 in which the
court of criminal appeals reviewed the law of parties.1 38 Upon request of
either side, the trial court is required to apply the law to the specific facts of
the case. 139 When the law of parties is involved, the Almanza rule provides
that if the evidence clearly supports the defendant's guilt as a primary actor,
the failure to apply the law of parties to the facts, even on request, is harm-
less error. In contrast if a party makes a proper request and if (1) the prose-
cution's theory of guilt is based on the law of parties, (2) there is conflicting
evidence that the defendant is guilty as a primary actor, or (3) there is a basis
to reject the state's evidence that the defendant is guilty as a primary actor,
then under the Almanza rule the failure to apply the law of parties to the
facts is reversible error.14°
The court reviewed the law concerning giving the jury a charge on accom-
plice witnesses in Gamez v. State.'4 1 If a prosecution witness could be prose-
cuted for the crime in the indictment against the defendant, the prosecution
witness is an accomplice witness as a matter of law.1 42 If the evidence
clearly shows that the witness is an accomplice, then the jury should be in-
136. Id. at 508. The case was remanded for an Almanza determination to see if there was
any harm since the issue was raised by a proper objection to the charge. Id.; see also LaPoint
v. State, No. 227-86 (Tex. Crim. App., Nov. 26, 1986) (not yet reported) (affirming appellate
court reversal because some harm shown); Turner v. State, 720 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (remanded for Almanza egregious harm test since no trial objection raised).
137. 739 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App., 1987).
138. Sections 7.01 and 7.02 of the Penal Code provide in part:
§ 7.01. Parties To Offenses
(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is
committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is crimi-
nally responsible, or by both.
§ 7.02. Criminal Responsibility For Conduct Of Another
(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the con-
duct of another if: (1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the of-
fense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in
conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense; (2) acting with intent to pro-
mote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs,
aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or (3) having a
legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to pro-
mote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent
commission of the offense.
(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another
felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the
felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense
was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should
have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01-.02 (Vernon 1974).
139. Johnson, 739 S.W.2d at 305.
140. Id. at 304-05.
141. 737 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Whether or not a witness is an accomplice
affects the consideration of sufficiency of evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14
(Vernon 1979). The jury or the appellate court eliminates from consideration the testimony of
the accomplice and then examines the evidence of the other witnesses to ascertain whether the
incriminating character of the evidence tends to connect the defendant with the commission of
the offense. Id. If it does, the corroboration is sufficient. Id
142. Gamez, 737 S.W.2d at 322.
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structed that the witness is an accomplice witness as a matter of law. 143 If
there is a question from the evidence whether or not the witness is an accom-
plice witness, then the jury should be instructed to determine as a matter of
fact whether or not he is an accomplice witness.144 No charge is required if
the evidence clearly shows that the witness is not an accomplice witness. 45
The court of criminal appeals' decision in Turner v. State 146 involved the
specificity of objections to the jury charge. In Turner the court of appeals
reversed an aggravated sexual assault conviction finding error in an instruc-
tion that the defendant could be convicted if he committed the offense within
a period of three years preceding the filing of the indictment.147 The court of
appeals concluded that the instruction permitted a conviction for an offense
that may have occurred prior to the effective date of the Penal Code provi-
sions making the conduct a criminal offense. 148 The court based its reversal
on the appellant's trial objection that the charge failed to apply the law to
the facts and allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of an offense with
which he had not been charged in the indictment.149 The court of criminal
appeals reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the conviction by holding
that the trial objection was too general and ambiguous to properly preserve
error for appeal. 150
VI. PROSECUTORIAL ARGUMENT
Claims asserting that prosecutors exceeded the bounds of proper jury ar-
gument have consistently formed the basis of criminal appeals. 15 A review
of the cases decided during this Survey period yields only one significant
opinion. In Good v. State 152 the defendant's testimony included an alibi de-
fense. During closing argument, over objection, the prosecutor said:
You observed his [appellant's] demeanor in this courtroom and I sub-
mit to you it is a reasonable deduction that he would have reacted in
some way, shown some concern. He has just sat there cold, unnerved,
uncaring, just like he was like that morning.... [T]hat has to do with
the fact that he is guilty and he could care less this week that he is guilty
and he could care less back on [that morning]. . . 'Anybody would be
able to sympathize, would be able to have some concern for what [vic-
tim] went through.' Why ... didn't we see any of that in his [appel-




146. 726 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
147. Turner v. State, 701 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985).
148.. Id. at 934. The child victim testified that she had been assaulted on numerous occa-
sions, both before and after the date alleged in the indictment. The period included times prior
to the enactment of Texas Penal Code article 22.011(a)(2)(A) (effective September 1, 1983).
701 S.W.2d at 934.
149. 726 S.W.2d at 141.
150. Id.
151. See Goranson, supra note 13, at 566-67; Keck & Johnson, supra note 13, at 641.
152. 723 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
153. Id. at 735.
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The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction, holding that,
although the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's demeanor exhib-
ited while testifying, the prosecutor must avoid commentary on all other
neutral or passive and orderly courtroom demeanor of the defendant during
trial. 54 The comments injected facts not contained in the record, since neu-
tral courtroom demeanor is not evidence. 155 Furthermore, the comments
constituted an unreasonable inference of guilt since the defendant is sup-
posed to sit orderly in the courtroom. 156
VII. PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING
Although without direct application to Texas state law at the present
time, the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Florida 157 may have some
application to federal cases since Congress revised the whole federal sentenc-
ing structure on November 1, 1987.158 The Miller case concerned the effect
of the ex post facto clause 159 of the United States Constitution on changes in
sentencing law. In Miller the State of Florida employed a new sentencing
scheme that confined the trial judge's sentencing discretion significantly
more than the sentencing scheme in effect at the time of the offense. The
unanimous opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, emphasized that changes
in sentencing laws adopted after the defendant commits a crime may not be
used if the revised guidelines are more onerous than the guidelines in effect
when the defendant committed the offense. 160 Justice O'Connor stated that
the basic test asked whether the law applied to events occurring before its
enactment and whether the law disadvantaged the offender by affecting sub-
stantial personal rights. 16 ' The Court specifically noted that a defendant
need not prove that he would have obtained a lesser sentence under the old
law in order to show that the new law disadvantaged him.162
In Kelly v. Robinson 163 the Supreme Court held that restitution orders
imposed as part of a criminal sentence are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Unlike traditional criminal fines, restitution payments are generally for-
warded to the victim. Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Powell reasoned
154. Id. at 736, 738.
155. Id. at 736.
156. Id. at 738.
157. 107 S. Ct. 2446, 96 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1987).
158. Congress extensively revised chapters 229, 231, 232, and 311 of Title 18 of the United
States Code effective November 1, 1987. See Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, October 12, 1984,
98 Stat. 2027, as amended by Pub. L. 99-217, December 26, 1985, 99 Stat. 1728. The change
basically removes the indefinite sentencing procedures and parole law and adopts a specific
sentence, grid system. See generally, United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines and
Policy Statements for the Federal Courts, 41 CRIM. L. 3087; United States Sentencing Com-
mission Guidelines - Supplementary Materials, 41 CRIM. L. 3145.
159. Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution provides: "No... ex post facto
Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Article I, section 10 provides: "No state
shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law, .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
160. 107 S. Ct. at 2451, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 360.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2452, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 361.
163. 107 S. Ct. 353, 362, 93 L. Ed. 2d 216, 230 (1986).
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that the decision to impose restitution usually turns on th'e state's penal goals
and the defendant's situation, rather than on the victim's injury. 64 Since
restitution formed a part of a plan furthering the penal and rehabilitative
interests of the state, the Court decided that restitution should be treated the
same as traditional fines. 165
The trial court in Ellis v. State 166 submitted a jury instruction to which
the parties failed to object that told the jury the judge could impose nine
conditions of probation, although article 42.12, section 6 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 167 actually contains nineteen conditions of probation.
The jury instruction also stated that the trial court could not add other con-
ditions of probation, even though article 42.12, section 3 of the Code 168 per-
mits the trial court to impose additional conditions. Employing an Almanza
analysis, 169 the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court's error
showed egregious harm since in this case the defendant entered a guilty plea
and the sole issue was probation. 170 The erroneous instructions had pre-
cluded the jury from considering that the judge could add special conditions
of probation, such as drug testing. Furthermore, the prosecutor told the
jury in argument that some of the conditions were unenforceable. The court
of criminal appeals also found that, although the defendant received a ten
year prison sentence, he appeared an excellent candidate for probation. 171
Good time credit provided the subject for two cases decided during the
Survey period. In Ex parte Smiley 172 the trial court revoked the accused's
probation on one offense and entered a fifteen year sentence on a second
offense. Due to a clerical error., the Department of Corrections was not noti-
fied of the fifteen year sentence. After being discharged on the probation
revocation sentence, the defendant sought back time credit for the fifteen
year sentence. The court of criminal appeals held that she was entitled to
flat time credit for the time after sentencing, including the days after her
release from custody. 173 She was also entitled to the same good time credit
as she earned on the probation revocation sentence since the system errone-
ously released her through no fault of her own. 174 In the second case, Ex
parte Daniels,'75 the court of criminal appeals allowed good time credit
against a sentence for contempt awarded at the sheriff's discretion. 76
164. Id
165. Id at 363, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 231.
166. 723 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
167. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
168. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
169. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
170. Ellis, 723 S.W.2d at 673.
171. Id.
172. 730 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
173. Id. at 759.
174. Id.
175. 722 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
176. Id at 712. Compare Daniels with Ex parte Cruthirds, 712 S.W.2d 749, 753-54 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986), which disallowed good time for time served as a condition of probation. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(6)(b)(c).
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As recent Surveys indicate, 177 the determination whether or not a deadly
weapon is used in the commission of an offense critically affects the sentenc-
ing process. During this Survey period the court of criminal appeals decided
two more cases concerning the issue. In Ex Parte Brooks 178 the defendant
had been convicted of murder, but the trial court made no affirmative finding
on the use of a deadly weapon. Nevertheless, prison authorities calculated
Brook's parole eligibility date as if the trial court made an affirmative finding
that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the offense. The court
of criminal appeals held that the trial court failed to enter a proper affirma-
tive finding and ordered the prison authorities to allow good time. 179 In Ex
parte Shaw 180 the trial court placed the defendant on probation for robbery.
The trial court made no affirmative finding concerning use of a deadly
weapon. Later, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and made
an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon had been used. The court of
criminal appeals held that a finding of use of a deadly weapon can only be
entered in the original judgment and not when probation is revoked. 181
In 1987 the legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to allow
consecutive sentences when a court probates a sentence.18 2 In felonies the
cumulative total of suspended sentences cannot exceed ten years.183 In mis-
demeanors the cumulative total cannot exceed the maximum period of im-
prisonment applicable to the misdemeanor offenses and in no event more
than two years.184 Further, if a defendant has been convicted in two or more
cases and the court suspends the imposition of one sentence, the court can-
not order a sentence of confinement to commence after completion of the
suspended sentence. 185
VIII. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF APPEAL
A. Retroactivity
In Griffith v. Kentucky 186 the United States Supreme Court announced a
major change in rules concerning the retroactive application of new constitu-
tional standards. Prior Supreme Court cases established that a decision an-
nouncing a new standard almost automatically applied non-retroactively if
177. See Goranson, supra note 13, at 568-69; Keck & Johnson, supra note 13, at 647-48; see
also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42.12, § 3g, 42.18, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
178. 722 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
179. Id. at 141-42.
180. 724 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
181. Id. at 77. In Ex parte Esquivel, No. 69,707 (Tex. Crim. App., June 17, 1987), the
defendant was placed on a deferred adjudication pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.12, § d (Vernon Supp. 1988). The court of criminal appeals held that in such situations
it was proper to delay the affirmative finding until the probation is revoked and the defendant
is found guilty.
182. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Prior case law had
prohibited cumulation of probated sentences. See Green v. State, 706 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986).
183. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
184. Id.
185. Id. art. 42.08(c).
186. 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987).
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the decision explicitly overruled past precedent.1 87 In Griffith a 6-3 majority
found the clear break analysis inappropriate because the exception was in-
consistent with the nature of judicial review188 and treated similarly situated
defendants differently.1 89 The Court held that any new rule for conducting
criminal prosecutions should apply retroactively to all cases, both state and
federal, whether pending review or not yet final, and that there should be no
exception for new rules that clearly differ from past rules.1 90
B. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
The concurrent sentence doctrine permits appellate courts to decline to
review convictions on counts whose sentences run concurrently to other
sentences that a court reviewed and found valid. 91 In Ray v. United
States 192 the Supreme Court dealt a blow to the doctrine in federal cases.
Under current federal law, 193 the court levies a mandatory fifty dollar spe-
cial assessment against an individual on each count for which he is con-
victed.' 94 The Supreme Court held in Ray that since the defendant's liability
depends on the validity of each count in the judgment, the sentences are not
concurrent. '95 The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to con-
sider the defendant's challenge to his second conviction. 196
C State's Right of Appeal
Article V, section 26 of the Texas Constitution 97 was amended in No-
vember 1987, to permit the state to appeal in a criminal case as authorized
by the legislature. 198 Article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure' 99
was amended to permit the state to appeal a court's order in a criminal case
if the order: (1) dismisses an indictment, information or complaint; (2) ar-
187. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), the Court held that retroactivity de-
pended on "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." In United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 549 (1982) the Court modified the rule by stating that a new constitutional standard
would apply to all cases on direct review, unless the new rule clearly broke with past prece-
dent. Once the Court determined that the new rule was unanticipated, the second and third
Stovall factors practically compelled a non-retroactivity finding. Id. at 549-50.
188. The announcing of new, prospective-only rules was deemed to be a legislative func-
tion, whereas the Court adjudicates cases and controversies. 107 S. Ct. at 713, 93 L. Ed. 2d at
658 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
189. Id. at 715-16, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 661.
190. Id. at 716, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 661.
191. Ray v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2093, 2093, 95 L. Ed. 2d 693, 694 (1987) (per
curiam).
192. Id.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (Supp. 1987).
194. United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 380 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 667,
93 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1986).
195. 107 S. Ct. at 2093, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95.
196. Id. at 2093-94, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
197. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 26.
198. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 26 provides: "The State is entitled to appeal in criminal cases,
as authorized by general law."
199. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
rests or modifies a judgment; (3) grants a new trial; (4) sustains a claim of
former jeopardy; or (5) grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession or
an admission. The statute permits state appeals on orders granting motions
to suppress only if jeopardy has not attached and the prosecuting attorney
certifies that the appeal is not taken to delay and that the evidence, confes-
sion or admission is of substantial importance in the case. 2°° The statute
also permits the state to appeal a sentence upon a contention that the sen-
tence is illegal. 20 1 Under the statute as amended, the state may appeal a
ruling on a question of law if the defendant is convicted and appeals the
judgment.20 2 Except when a convicted defendant appeals, the state has fif-
teen days after the entry of order, ruling, or sentence to file notice of ap-
peal.20 3 The state is further entitled to a stay of the proceedings pending a
disposition of an appeal of an order or an appeal of an illegal sentence. 2°4 If
the state appeals and the defendant is released on bail, the defendant may
remain free on the existing bail.205 If the defendant is in custody and the
state appeals, the defendant is entitled to reasonable bail unless the appeal is
from an order terminating the prosecution, which entitles the defendant to
release on a personal bond.206 The state's right to appeal became effective on
November 3, 1987, when a popular vote approved the constitutional amend-
ment. The right to appeal applies to orders, rulings or sentences that oc-
curred on or after the effective date of the amendment.20 7
D. Bail
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established the proper forums in
which to appeal denials of bail in Primrose v. State.20 8 If the court denies the
defendant bail because he is charged with a capital offense and the proof is
evident,2°9 the defendant must appeal to the proper court of appeals. 210 If,
however, bail is denied because the defendant has previous felony convic-
tions or a pending felony action and the evidence substantially shows
guilt,211 the defendant must appeal to the court of criminal appeals.212
E. Appellate Argument
The state in Tallant v. State 213 conceded the invalidity of a search warrant
before the court of appeals and based its argument on the harmless error
200. Id.
201. Id. art. 44.01(b).
202. Id. art. 44.01(c).
203. Id. art. 44.01(d).
204. Id. art. 44.01(e).
205. Id. art. 44.01(g).
206. Id.
207. Act of 1987, ch. 382, §§ 2, 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3751 (Vernon).
208. 725 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
209. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11.
210. Primrose, 725 S.W.2d at 256.
211. See TEx. CONST. art. I, § I la (expressly according a right of appeal to the court of
criminal appeals).
212. Primrose, 725 S.W.2d at 255.
213. 742 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Crim. App., 1987, pet. reh'g filed).
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doctrine. On petition for discretionary review in the court of criminal ap-
peals, however, the state argued that the defendant failed to properly pre-
serve the error below. The court of criminal appeals held that the state
could not concede error before the court of appeals and then argue the fail-
ure to preserve error before the court of criminal appeals. 2
14
F Test for Sufficiency on Appeal
During the last Survey period, the court of criminal appeals in Van Guil-
der v. State215 recognized new law concerning the proper appellate standard
for determining sufficiency of evidence issues raised by a jury's implicit rejec-
tion of the affirmative defense of insanity. 216 During this Survey period the
court applied the new appellate standard of review to a jury's finding of com-
petency in Arnold v. State.217 The court of criminal appeals explained that
since the standard of proof of incompetency is the same as the standard of
proof for insanity, the standard of review for insanity established in Van
Guilder could be used in a case involving competency. 2
18
G. Effect of Reversal
Case law had firmly established that reversals for punishment error in
cases in which a jury decided both guilt and punishment required a retrial on
both issues. 219 In 1987 the legislature amended article 44.29 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to provide that in a case reversed for punishment error
only, the case is remanded for retrial only on the issue of punishment.
220
The new rule became effective on August 31, 1987, and does not apply to
capital murder cases. 221
214. Id. at 5. The court did recognize some inconsistency in prior rulings, but reminded all
parties that a petition for discretionary review is "limited to those points of error decided by
the courts of appeals .. " Id. at 4 (quoting Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 353, n.9 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986)).
215. 709 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2891,
90 L. Ed. 2d 978 (1986). For a discussion of Van Guilder see Goranson, supra note 13, at 573-
74.
216. In Van Guilder v. State the court held that the appellate court must review the evi-
dence on the insanity defense by looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
implicit finding by the jury and then decide, by examining all the evidence, if any rational trier
of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove his defense by a preponderance of
the evidence. Van Guilder, 709 S.W.2d at 181; see Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 328
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (applying Van Guilder standard).
217. 719 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
218. Id.
219. "[I]f on appeal it is determined that reversible error occurred at the hearing on pun-
ishment before a jury, the Court of Criminal Appeals is without authority to direct a new trial
or penalty hearing before a different jury on the issue of punishment alone." Bullard v. State,
548 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversed on other grounds in Cooper v. State, 631
S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). If reversible error occurs at the penalty hearing before
the trial judge alone, the case on appeal may be remanded to the trial court for the proper
assessment of punishment. Bullard, 548 S.W.2d at 18.
220. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
221. Id., art. 44.29(c).
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